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Vacatur of Labor Arbitration
Awards: Watering Down the
Supreme Court's "Drawn From the
Essence" Precedent May Sound the
Death Knell for Labor Arbitration
CITGO Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Paper,Allied-Indus., Chem., & Energy Workers Int'l
Union Local No. 2-9911
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the Supreme Court's consistent holdings that prohibit federal courts
from reaching the merits of labor arbitration awards, many circuit courts have
subtly refused to restrain their desire to vacate labor arbitrator's awards with
which they disagree by developing tests that water down the Supreme Court's
"drawn from the essence" precedent. 2 As a result, labor unions and employers
should be aware that they may no longer rely on the finality of a labor arbitrator's
award as courts show increased willingness to delve into the merits of an arbitration dispute.3
In CITGO Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Paper,Allied-Indus., Chem., & Energy Workers Int'l Union Local No. 2-991, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, while
merely giving lip service to Supreme Court precedent, further contributes to the
situation where many circuit courts insidiously refuse to follow the Supreme
Court's prohibition against reaching the merits of a labor arbitrator's award. It
would appear that only through renewed Supreme Court vigilance and clarity can
this trend be impeded.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In December 1998, CITGO Asphalt Refining Company (CITGO)4 implemented a no tolerance substance abuse policy (the Policy) at each of its more than
sixty petroleum refining facilities in the United States. 5 CITGO implemented the
Policy, in part, to maintain its status as having the best safety record in the industry. 6 The new Policy provided for random drug testing of all company employees,
1. 385 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 2004).
2. See infra LH.B.
3. See Anna Knull, Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l: The Fifth Circuit Dispenses Its Own Brand of Justice in Reviewing a Labor Arbitration Award, 78 TUL. L. REv. 2305

(2004).
4. CITGO Petroleum is the majority partner of the New Jersey partnership, CARCO. CITGO, 385
F.3d at 810.
5. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 810-11.
6. id. at 814.
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for on-duty and off-duty conduct, regardless of whether there was reason to suspect an employee had a substance abuse problem. 7 If an employee tested positive
for drug use, automatic termination would result. 8 However, under the Policy's
"self-acknowledgement" clause, an employee who came forward and admitted
their drug use prior to a positive drug test would be given 9a second chance-an
opportunity for rehabilitation without automatic termination.
Upon implementation of the Policy in CITGO's Savannah, Georgia plant,
Local 3-0673 of the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (PACE) filed a grievance challenging the new Policy, which proceeded to arbitration. 10 The arbitrator ruled entirely in CITGO's favor, finding the
new Policy was reasonable and valid in every respect."
The new Policy was also challenged by PACE Local 2-991 at CITGO's3
12
Paulsboro, New Jersey asphalt plant, when Local 2-991 filed two grievances.'
In the first grievance, Local 2-991 alleged that CITGO had violated the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) through "[i]mproper implementation of a 'new' drug
and alcohol policy," by not bargaining over the new policy.' 4 The second grievance alleged CITGO had "implemented a drug and alcohol policy that was totally
unreasonable."' 5 The grievances ultimately proceeded to arbitration after the
parties agreed to submit the following question to the arbitrator: "Did CITGO
violate Article XXX of the Labor Agreement by improperly implementing its
National Substance Abuse Policy at' 6the Paulsboro facility on October 1, 1999? If
not, was the policy unreasonable?"'
Article XXX, the Future Bargaining Clause, provided that each party "waives
the right to further bargaining on any subject
not covered or covered under this
17
Agreement and any attachments hereto."'

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 811.
Id.
Id.
Id.

11. Id.

12. The Paulsboro facility negotiated its first labor contract in 1997, after engaging in the processing
of crude oil into asphalt and other products since the late 1970s. Id. at 811 nl.
13. Id. at 811. At the time the grievances were filed, there were some 56 bargaining unit members.
Id. at 811 n.l.
14. Id. at81!.
15. Id.
16. Id. at811-12. The parties further stipulated that the Management Rights Clause (Article III)
and
the Future Bargaining Clause (Article XXX)inthe then-current CBA were identical to those contained
in every CBA implemented between the parties since 1977. Id. at 812.
17. Id. at 812-13. Article XXX provides:
The parties acknowledge that, during the negotiations which resulted in this Agreement and any
attachments hereto, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals
with respect to any subject.., not removed from the area of collective bargaining ...and therefore each waives the right to further bargaining on any subject not covered or covered under this
Agreement and any attachments hereto during the term hereof.
The parties also stipulated that:
(1).The Paulsboro refinery is a hazardous work environment that can explode and poses a potential threat to workers, the environment, and to the public at large.
(2). The bargaining unit positions affected by the drug testing policy are safety sensitive (as defined in [Department of Transportation] regulations).
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Several provisions of the CBA were considered by the arbitrator as they related to whether Article XXX had been violated. Article III, the Management
Rights Clause, provided that CITGO retained all of its rights preexisting the CBA
execution to the extent not expressly abridged by a specific provision contained in
the CBA, including the right to "make or enforce rules for the maintenance of
discipline or safety, and to suspend, discharge, or otherwise discipline employees
for just cause."' 8 Article XXV, titled "Grievance Procedure and Arbitration,"
provides for the arbitration process through many subsections.19 Subsection 25.1
defined "grievances" as alleged violations of express and specific provisions of
the CBA, and provides that neither party may attempt to use the grievance procedures to in any way change, modify, supplement, or alter the CBA.2° Subsection
25.4 provides that CITGO and Local 2-991 "both agree that the submission to the
arbitrator shall be based on the original written grievance submitted in the grievance procedure.'
Subsection 25.6 strictly limits the arbitrator's powers to determining the meaning and interpretation of explicit CBA terms, prohibits the
arbitrator from modifying any CBA terms, limits the arbitrator's power to deciding whether a violation of the CBA has occurred, and prohibits the arbitrator from
basing an award on any practices or oral understandings outside the CBA.22
(3). The duties of the bargaining unit employees are such that their attempts to perform while in
a state of drug impairment may pose a threat to co-workers, to the workplace, to the environment,
and to the public at large.
(4). All employees (management and bargaining unit employees alike) at Paulsboro play a critical role in both preventing accidents and minimizing the effects of accidents.
(5). The speed in responding to a dangerous condition is critical to limiting potential damage and
injury.
Id.
18. Id. at 812. Article III provides, in relevant part:
Except to the extent expressly abridged by an express and specific provision of this Agreement,
the Company reserves and retains all of its Common Law or other rights to manage the business
as such rights existed prior to the execution of this or any other previous Agreement with the Union or any other Union. The rights of management which are not abridged by this Agreement,
shall include, but are not limited to: ... make and enforce rules for the maintenance of discipline
and safety, and to suspend, discharge, or otherwise discipline employees for just cause. The listing of specific rights in this Agreement is not intended to be nor shall it be restrictive of or a
waiver of any of the rights of management not listed and specifically surrendered herein, whether
or not such rights have been exercised by the Company in the past.
Id.
19. Id.
20. Article 25.1 reads:
Grievances are defined as alleged violations of express and specific provisions of this Agreement
occurring during the term of this Agreement or any renewal or extension thereof.... Neither the
Union nor an employee shall use or attempt to use the grievance procedure as a means of changing, amending, modifying, supplementing or otherwise altering in any respect whatsoever this
Agreement or any part thereof.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Article 25.6 reads:
The power and authority of the arbitrator shall be strictly limited to determining the meaning and
interpretation of the explicit terms of this Agreement as herein expressly set forth. The arbitrator
shall not have authority to add or to subtract from or modify any of said terms, or to limit or impair any Common Law or other right of the Company, or to establish or change any wage or rate
of pay .... The parties agree that the power and jurisdiction of any arbitrator chosen hereunder
shall be limited to deciding whether there has been a violation of the provision of this Agreement.
The arbitrator shall not substitute his judgment for that of the Company in the absence of a clear
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The arbitrator, after listening to several witnesses testify for each side, found
that CITGO had not breached the CBA with respect to unilaterally adopting a
substance abuse program, and that the random testing procedure was both proper
and reasonable. 23 However, the arbitrator ruled for Local 2-991 in finding part of
the zero tolerance policy was unreasonable. 24 In his written award, the arbitrator
acknowledged that CITGO certainly has the right to address safety concerns adequately and that he wished not to disturb CITGO's best record for safety in the
industry. 25 However, the arbitrator stated that since testimony revealed two other
refineries in the industry gave second chances after a positive drug test, that "it
has not been shown to my satisfaction that permitting an employee to have a 'second chance' would be inconsistent with this goal [of maintaining the best safety
record in the industry]. 26 The arbitrator then declared, "the Policy, without giving a second chance for rehabilitation, is unreasonable
....
I therefore find that
27
the Policy should be modified in that regard.,
In response to the arbitrator's ruling, CITGO filed a complaint in the district
court of New Jersey seeking vacatur of the arbitration award alleging that the
arbitrator (1) exceeded his power and authority, (2) failed to render an award
drawn from the essence of the CBA, (3) ignored limitations on his authority contained in the CBA, (4) rendered an award unsupported by the record, and (5)
failed to apply the CBA's standard of review. 28 Local 2-991 counterclaimed, and
each party filed motions for summary judgment to which the district court responded by entering an order granting summary
judgment for Local 2-991 by
29
affirming the arbitrator's award in its entirety.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, vacating the
arbitration award by holding that (1) the arbitrator acted outside the scope of his
delegated authority by rendering an award that did not draw its essence from the
CBA, 30 and (2) the arbitrator's decision that the zero tolerance policy was unreasonable is not supported by the record.3'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before 1925, it was a common law rule that executory agreements to arbitrate
were not enforceable in federal courts. 32 In 1925, however, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act, 33 which specifically rejected the common law rule by
abuse of discretion. The arbitrator shall not be empowered, and shall have no jurisdiction, to
base his Award on any alleged practices or oral understandings which are not incorporated in
writing in this Agreement....
Id.
23. Id. at 814.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 815.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 816.
31. Id. at 818.
32. Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration:
An Idea Whose Time has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 784 (2000).
33. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2004).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss2/12

4

Waldron: Waldron: Vacatur of Labor Arbitration Awards

2005]

Vacaturof Labor Awards

making future agreements to arbitrate explicitly enforceable. 34 Although judicial
hostility toward agreements to arbitrate persisted for some time, beginning in
1957, the Supreme Court began to respond to this hostility when it interpreted
section 301(a) of the Labor Managers Relations Act 35 (LMRA) as encompassing
labor agreements to arbitrate, even though the LMRA failed to explicitly reference
arbitration. 36 In so doing, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that the FAA
does not govern labor arbitration, and that standards governing labor arbitration
must be defined as a matter of federal common law rather than the FAA.37
A. Developing a Supreme Standard
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, Justice Douglas declared that LMRA § 301(a) "expresses a federal policy that federal courts should
enforce these [arbitration] agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations"
38
and further explained that this was the best way to maintain industrial peace.
Arbitration provisions were included in around ninety-five percent of all CBAs in
the United States at the time Lincoln Mills was decided,39 yet this decision marked
a substantial policy shift in favor of upholding labor arbitration awards.
A trilogy of cases in 1960 reinforced the Lincoln Mills holding, and further
delineated the role federal courts are to play in reviewing labor arbitration
awards. 4° One of these three decisions, Enterprise Wheel, specifically addressed
vacatur of arbitration awards. 4' Justice Douglas, writing again for the majority,

34. Hayford, supranote 32, at 784. Section 2 of the FAA reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (2005). Originally enacted in 1947, § 301(a) of the LMRA currently exists
as 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) and reads:
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2005).
36. Hayford, supra note 32, at 786.
37. STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 105 (2001). None of the post-1957
Supreme Court decisions addressed the FAA with regard to labor arbitration until the Supreme Court
decided UnitedPaperworkersInt'l Union v. MISCO, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), in which it recognized
the FAA does not govern labor arbitration. Id.
38. 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
39. Hayford, supra note 32, at 786.
40. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
41. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's vacatur of a
labor arbitration award because it found the appellate court refused to enforce the reinstatement and
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declared that refusing to review the merits of an arbitrator's award pursuant to a
CBA is the "proper approach" for the federal courts.42 To hold otherwise, he
stated, would prevent the arbitrator's decision from being final, as the parties had
agreed for it to be in their CBA.43 The Court therefore reasoned that it had no
business allowing the lower court to overrule the arbitrator simply because that
court's interpretation of the contract was different from that of the arbitrator. In
the Court's view, the question of interpretation is solely a question for the arbitrator."

The Court explained, however, that the arbitrator is confined by the CBA, and
that "he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. 4a Furthermore, while the arbitrator may look to many sources of guidance in making his
decision, the "award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. 4 6 Thus, the primary standard for determining
vacatur of an arbitration award pursuant to a CBA is whether the arbitrator's decision is "drawn from the essence" of the CBA, and vacatur is only possible when
the arbitrator's words "manifest an infidelity to this obligation," 47 allowing the
court to vacate the award. The Court cautioned though that a mere ambiguity in
the arbitrator's opinion will not permit the inference that his authority has been
exceeded, since arbitrators have no obligation to the court to provide reasons for
an award.48
Only four times since the Supreme Court's 1960 Trilogy has the Court revisited the issue of vacatur in labor arbitration.49 In 1983, the Court in W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Local Union 75950 reaffirmed the principles of Enterprise Wheel, 5 ' but also
formulated a new vacatur exception: "a court may not enforce a [CBA] that is
against public policy." 2 The Court reasoned that such a public policy, however,
partial back pay portions of the award merely because it disagreed with the arbitrator's construction of
the contract. Id. at 598.
42. id. at 596.
43. Id. at 599.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 597.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598. Ostensibly, it would appear that since an arbitrator has no
obligation to a court to provide reasons for an award, a court would have almost no ability to vacate an
arbitrator's award where the award simply rendered judgment without any explanation of the rationale
used to reach its determination.
49. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); E. Associated Coal
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); United Paperworkers Int'l Union
v. MISCO, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United
Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
50. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. 757. Grace & Co. had entered into a conciliation agreement with the
EEOC which conflicted with their CBA so that complying with the EEOC agreement subjected Grace
& Co. to liability through the CBA's mandated arbitrator. Id. at 760. The Court held that it was Grace
& Co. who willfully entered into both agreements, and thus it violated no public policy to hold Grace
& Co. to the bargain it struck. Id. at 771-72.
51. The Court reaffirmed the central holdings of Enterprise Wheel that a federal court may not
overrule an arbitrator's award simply because he would have reached a different result; that an arbitrator must draw the essence of his award from the CBA; and that the parties were entitled to the bargain
they struck in choosing the arbitrator's determination to be final, such that "[a] federal court may not
second-guess it." W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 765 (citing EnterpriseWheel, 363 U.S. at 599).
52. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
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must be "well defined and dominant," ascertainable by reference to legal precedent and laws rather than merely a public interest.53
In 1987, the Supreme Court in United PaperworkersInternational Union v.
MISCO, Inc., reversed the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by holding that
courts have "no business weighing the merits of [a] grievance, considering
whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim."'54 The
Court further held that "a court should not reject an award on the ground that the
arbitrator misread the contract." 55 In finding that no public policy exception warranted vacatur in this case, the Court warned that its holdings do not "sanction
a
56
broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy."
One of two most recent Supreme Court decisions to address labor arbitration
vacatur is Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 17, decided in 2000. 57 There, the CBA provided that in order to discharge
an employee, Eastern needed to prove just cause for the termination. 58 When a
labor arbitrator ordered Eastern to reinstate an employee truck driver who had
tested positive for marijuana use on two separate occasions, Eastern filed suit to
vacate the award. 59 Both the district court, and the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held vacatur was not warranted because the award did not violate a
public policy against allowing
dangerous machinery to be used by employees who
6
tested positive for drugs. 0
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that its precedent made clear
that the public policy exception may not be invoked unless the award "runs contrary to an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy, as ascertained by
reference to positive law and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.'
Having found no specific provision of any law or regulation, the
Court affirmed, but not without some dicta that caused a concurrence: "[w]e
agree, in principle, that the courts' authority to invoke the public policy exception
is not limited solely to instances of positive law. 62
The most recent Supreme Court decision illustrates the Court's intolerance
for lower federal courts reaching the merits of a labor arbitration award. In Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, decided in 2001, the Court, in a per
curiam decision, reversed the Ninth Circuit for delving into the merits of an arbi53. Id.
54. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. MISCO, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987) (quoting Steelworkers
v. Am. Mfg. Co.; 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (emphasis omitted; footnote omitted)). In MISCO,the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had affirmed the district
court's vacatur of a labor arbitration award that reinstated an employee because the court found reinstatement would violate public policy against operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the
influence of drugs. Id. at 31. The Court held that the public policy exception was not satisfied because
such policy must be ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedence and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. Id.at 43.
55. Id.at 38.
56. Id. at 43.
57. E.Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., District 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
58. Id. at 60.
59. Id. at 60-61.
60. Id.at 61.
61. Id.at 63.
62. Id.at 67-68.
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trator's award, vacating that award, and then remanding the case to the arbitrator
with instructions to enter an award for a specific party. The Court reiterated that
even if a court is convinced the arbitrator committed "serious error," this is not
enough to overturn the arbitrator's decision. 64 Furthermore, the Court explained,
it is not a basis to overturn an award if there is "improvident, even silly, factfinding. ''65 The Court noted "[tfo be sure, the Court of Appeals here recited these
[Supreme Court] principles, but its application of them is nothing short of baffling." The Court also held that had vacatur been warranted, the proper remedy
would have been to remand the case for further arbitration
proceedings-not to
66
order the arbitrator to decide the issues a certain way.
B. The Divided Circuit Courts
Despite the Supreme Court's attempt to provide bright-line rules concerning
when a court may vacate a labor arbitration award, in recent years a majority of
the circuit courts have diluted the "drawn from the essence" test by creating new
standards for determining vacatur of a labor arbitration award which require some
judicial consideration of the underlying
merits of the arbitrator's award and the
67
propriety of the arbitrator's rationale.
The First Circuit, for instance, has developed its own test that permits vacatur
of a labor arbitral award if the decision was "(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2)
based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could
conceivably have made such a ruling; 68
or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact.,
The Second Circuit has stated that "[a]n arbitrator's authority to settle disputes
under a collective bargaining agreement is contractual in nature, and is limited to
the powers that the agreement confers., 69 Therefore, it concluded, arbitrators
"may not shield an 'outlandish disposition of a grievance' from judicial review
'simply by making the right noises-noises of contractual interpretation.' 70
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, holds that a labor arbitration award may
be vacated where there is a "manifest disregard" of the agreement, wholly unsup-

63. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
64. Id. at 509.
65. Id. (citing MISCO, 484 U.S. at 39).
66. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 511.
67. Hayford, supra note 32, at 816.
68. Teamsters Local Union No. 42 v. Supervalu, Inc. 212 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Local
1445, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir.
1985)). The court cited to its 1985 opinion which further explained that the court developed this test in
light of its interpretation of Supreme Court precedent that the parties bargained only for the arbitrator's
decision and "are not entitled to judicial review unless it can be shown that the arbitrator acted in a
way for which neither party could have bargained." Stop & Shop Cos., 776 F.2d at 21. Even following Garvey, the First Circuit in New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rhode
Island Legal Services, 273 F.3d 425 (lst Cir. 2001), affirmed this tri-part test. 273 F.3d at 427.
69. Leed Architectural Prods., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 6674, 916 F.2d 63, 65 (2d
Cir. 1990) (citing Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Union Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680 (2d
Cir. 1966)).
70. Id. (quoting In re Marine Pollution Serv. Inc., 857 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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ported by the principles of contract construction and the "law of the shop."' 71 The
Third Circuit has also concluded that the arbitrator only has authority to decide the
issues actually submitted,
172 therefore allowing courts "province to review an arbitrator's interpretation.
The Fourth Circuit has held that an arbitrator is required to provide a rational
basis for his award, so that where the arbitrator "fails to discuss critical contract
terminology, which terminology might reasonably require an opposite
result, the
73
award cannot be considered to draw its essence from the contract.,
In the Fifth Circuit, "if the award is arbitrary, capricious or not adequately
grounded in the basic collective bargaining contract, it will not be enforced by the
courts." 74 The Fifth circuit has also concluded that "[iln applying the 'essence'
test, we have stated that an arbitration award 'must have a basis that is at least
rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the letter or purpose of the collective bargaining agreement .... [Tihe award must, in some logical way, be derived from the wording or purpose of the contract."' 7 5 Even following Garvey, the
Fifth Circuit has stated that "[o]ur cases have recognized that a district court may
vacate as arbitrary and capricious an arbitration award that arises from the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. 76
The Sixth Circuit similarly holds that vacatur is warranted whenever the
award (1) conflicts with an express term of the CBA; (2) imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the CBA; (3) is not "rationally supported
or derived from" the CBA; or (4) is based on "general fairness or equality rather
than exact terms" of the CBA.77
71. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 816 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287,
1295 (3d Cir. 1996)).
72. Id. (quoting Matteson v. Ryder System Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996)).
73. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers of Am. & Local Union No. 1452, 720
F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1983). The court justified this conclusion by stating that it would be "wholly
unsatisfactory" to allow an arbitrator to avoid review of his award "simply by the ruse of stating an
issue without discussing it." Id.
74. Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery and Confectionery Workers Int'l Union, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79,
81 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir.
1961)).
75. Bruce Hardwood Floors v. UBC, S. Council of Indus. Workers, Local Union No. 2713, 103 F.3d
449, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1325 (5th Cir.
1994) (citation omitted)). In Bruce Hardwood Floors, an employee was terminated after she lied to
her supervisor by requesting time off work to take her daughter to the doctor when she actually needed
to pay an electric bill. Id. at 450. A grievance was filed, and the arbitrator found outright termination
to be unreasonable, and reinstated the employee with a ten-day suspension. Id. at 450-51. The Fifth
Circuit vacated the arbitrator's award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because it
"conclude[d] that the award is not 'derived from the wording or purpose of the contract."' Id. at 452
(quoting Executone, 26 F.3d at 1325). The court, relying on Black's Law Dictionary, reasoned that
"lying" is by definition "immoral conduct" and that the CBA specifically allowed immediate discharge
of an employee for engaging in immoral conduct. Id. at 452.
Circuit Judge Benavides, in a vigorous dissent, chastised the majority for substituting its own interpretation of the CBA for that of the arbitrator. Id. at 453 (Benavides, C.J., dissenting). The dissent explained that since immoral conduct was not defined in the CBA, the majority reached the merits when
it interpreted "immoral conduct" as lying, which is not the court's proper role. Id. at 454 (Benavides,
C.J., dissenting).
76. Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 383 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
77. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. General Drivers, Local Union No 89, 972 F.2d 129, 134 (6th
Cir. 1992) (citing Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of An., 793 F.2d 759, 766 (6th Cir.
1986)).
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The Seventh Circuit mirrors the approach taken by the Second Circuit in that
it has held it will not affirm a labor arbitration award when it cannot find express
language in the CBA to sanction the remedy declared in the award.78 While the
court may not vacate simply because it disagrees with the arbitrator's interpreta-79
tion, "[i]f the misinterpretation is 'irrational,' however, the court may reverse.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit agrees with the Second Circuit that an arbitrator
may not shield an "outlandish disposition of a grievance" from judicial correction
"simply by making the right noises--noises of contract interpretation. "80
The Eighth Circuit has held that, absent reference to a probative contract term
in the decision, a strong presumption exists that the arbitrator's award was not
based on the contract. 81 In so holding, it appears to construe the "drawn from the
essence" standard as requiring the arbitrator to interpret "explicit provisions of the
contract" to support its award.
The Ninth Circuit, before its reversal by the Supreme Court in Major League
BaseballPlayers Ass'n v. Garvey, held that an arbitrator's award "must be a 'plausible interpretation' of the CBA. 83 Following Garvey however,
to what extent
84
this standard will continue to be followed is questionable.
The Tenth Circuit takes a more conservative approach, affirming labor arbitration awards "unless it can be said with positive assurance that the contract is not
susceptible to the arbitrator's interpretation. ' 85 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has referred to its permissible review of arbitral awards employing the86 "drawn from the
essence" test as being "among the narrowest known to the law."
The Eleventh Circuit takes the far more liberal approach used by the Fifth
Circuit. It will vacate awards it deems "arbitrary and capricious". 87 The Eleventh
Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, has also held it may vacate a labor arbitrator's
award that it finds to be "irrational. 88

78. Young Radiator Co. v. Int'l Union, United Auto Workers, 734 F.2d 321, 325 (7th Cir. 1984).
79. Indep. Employees' Union of Hillshire Farm Co. v. Hillshire Farm Co., Inc., 826 F.2d 530,
533 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Gringoleit Co. v. United Rubber Workers, Local No. 270, 769 F.2d 434,
439 (7th Cir. 1985)).
80. Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 187 (7th Cir. 1985) cert. denied; Ethyl
Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 475 U.S. 1010 (1986).
81. George A. Hormel & Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 9, 879 F.2d
347, 351 (8th Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 352.
83. Ass'n of W. Pulp & Paper Workers, Local 78 v. Rexam Graphic, Inc., 221 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2000).
84. See S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Utility Workers Union of Am., Local 132, 265 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2001).
Only the dissenting opinion applied the "plausible interpretation" standard, while the majority was
silent. Id. at 800 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). See also Smurfit Newsprint Corp. v. Ass'n of W. Pulp &
Paper Workers, Local 60, 59 Fed. Appx. 207 (9th Cir. 2003).
85. Sterling Colo. Beef Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7, 767 F.2d
718, 720 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Prof'l Hole Drilling, Inc., 574 F.2d
497, 503 (10th Cir. 1978)).
86. Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7, 886 F.2d 275,
276 (10th Cir. 1989).
87. United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778 (11 th Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted).
88. IMC-Agrico Co. v. Int'l Chem. Workers Council of United Food and Commercial Workers
Union, 171 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1999).
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In discussing its standard of review, practically every circuit court's opinions
reference major Supreme Court holdings like MISCO and Enterprise Wheel. As
the foregoing illustrates however, the divergence of the circuit courts from Supreme Court precedent is readily apparent.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper,Allied-Industrial, Chemical., & Energy Workers International Union Local No. 2-991, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit framed the issue on appeal as "the propriety of the arbitrator's determination that CITGO's zero tolerance policy is unreasonable." 89 In customary
fashion, the court addressed the relevant
standard of review before discussing
9
whether this case warranted vacature. 0
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court acknowledged it has a very limited
role, by stating it was "not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even
though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract." 91 Quoting MISCO, the court reiterated that, so long as
the arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the [CBA]" rather than merely the
arbitrator's "own brand of industrial justice," the award should be affirmed.92 The
court further acknowledged that it must defer all factual findings to the arbitrator,
because it is not the court's role to draw inferences that the fact finder did not.93
The court then relied on Third Circuit precedent to further clarify the standard
to be applied. The court declared, "we do not review an arbitrator's award for
legal error," 94and only where there is a "manifest disregard" of the agreement,
wholly unsupported by the principles of contract construction and the "law of the
shop," may a reviewing court vacate an award. 95 The court explained this to mean
that even if it were to find the basis for the award to be ambiguous or disagreeable
under the law, the court should affirm the award. 96 Furthermore, the court said it
may not vacate an award unless it is totally unsupported by the record, and that
such a decision need not be wise or even internally consistent to be upheld but is
subject only to a standard of minimal rationality. 97 Again, citing Third Circuit
precedent, the court concluded that the arbitrator only has authority to decide the
98
issues actually submitted,
therefore allowing courts "province to review an arbi99
trator's interpretation."
The court first addressed whether the Arbitrator acted outside the scope of his
delegated authority by rendering an award that failed to "draw its essence" from
89. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 813.
90. Id. at 815-16.
91. Id. at 815 (citing MISCO, 484 U.S. at 36).
92. Id. at 816 (citing MISCO, 484 U.S. at 36).
93. Id.
94. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 815 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287,
1295 (3d Cir. 1996)).
95. Id. at 816 (citing Exxon, 73 F.3d at 1295).
96. Id. (citing Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441
(3d Cir. 1992)).
97. Id. (citing Exxon, 73 F.3d at 1291, 1297).
98. Id. (citing Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1996)).
99. Id. (citing Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113).
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the CBA.1°° The court recited three findings of the arbitrator: (1) CITGO had the
right to make certain that safety concerns are paramount and adequately addressed, (2) CITGO had the best safety record in the industry and that the arbitrator wants to keep it that way, and (3) this safety record is a legitimate objective for
any company.' 0 Based on these facts, the court concluded that the arbitrator ignored parameters of the CBA when he wrote "[i]t has not been shown to my satisfaction that permitting an employee to have a 'second chance' would be inconsistent with [having the best safety record in the industry],"'10 2 and that
0 3 "the policy,
without giving a second chance for rehabilitation is unreasonable."'
In support of this contention, the court cited portions of the CBA that stated
the arbitrator "shall not substitute his judgment for that of the Company in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion."'1°4 The court contended that the arbitrator
' 10 5
did not find a clear abuse of discretion and that "this record supports none."
Therefore, held the court, the arbitrator substituted his own judgment for that of
the company and hence failed to base his opinion and award from the essence of
the CBA."0
Local 2-991 defended the arbitrator's decision by arguing that the parties'
submission to the arbitrator allowed the arbitrator to use a reasonableness standard
rather than the abuse of discretion standard. 10 7 In response, the court stated that
assuming "arguendo" that the submission trumped the abuse of discretion standard, and that only a reasonableness standard applied, the court would still vacate
the award because the arbitrator's decision that the zero tolerance policy is unreasonable is not supported by the record. 08
In support of the court's conclusion that the award was unsupported by the
record, the court stated that the arbitrator relied on only two facts to support his
conclusion: (1) that two other companies with inferior safety records do not have
zero tolerance policies, and (2) that provisions of the Omnibus Transportation
Employee Testing Act of 1991, '09 and the DOT regulations under it, 0 allow
employees a second chance for rehabilitation."' The court declared each of these
facts was "not sufficient to support a finding that CITGO's zero tolerance policy
is unreasonable."' " 2 The court explained that the former fact does not establish
that CITGO acted unreasonably in adopting a no tolerance policy, and that the
latter fact is distinguishable because of the "hazardous nature of CITGO's facilities, the need for prompt and unimpaired action in the event of an emergency,"
and the
policy provision excepting employees who step forward from termina3
tion.''
100. Id.
101. Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 816-17.
Id. at 817.
Id. (citing Article XXV, § 25.6 of the CBA).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 819 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31306 etseq. 2005).
Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 382. 101 et seq 2005.).

Ill. Id.

112. Id.
113. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss2/12

12

Waldron: Waldron: Vacatur of Labor Arbitration Awards

2005]

Vacatur of Labor Awards

The court concluded its arguments by stating that the CBA expressly gave
CITGO the right to make and enforce rules for the maintenance of discipline and
safety, and that the CBA precluded the CBA from being amended in the grievance
process." 14 The
court thus reversed the district court's order enforcing the arbitra15
tor's award."
V. COMMENT
In CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper,Allied-Industrial, Chemical, & Energy Workers InternationalUnion Local No. 2-991, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit failed to restrain itself from reaching the merits of the labor, arbitrator's award. This case squarely falls into the ambit of the maxim stating that "a
bad case makes bad law,""16 as the court clearly disagreed with the arbitrator's
interpretation of the CBA. The Third Circuit is not alone in failing to resist reaching the merits of a dispute. When an arbitrator's decision seems patently unfair,
or the merits wrongly decided, courts often bend over backwards to vacate an
award, all the while denying that they are reaching the merits of the dispute. Despite giving customary lip service to Supreme Court precedent, in CITGO, the
Third Circuit reached the merits of the dispute and substituted its judgment for
that of the arbitrators.
Rather than frame the issue on appeal as whether the arbitrator drew his
award from the essence of the CBA or otherwise violated public policy, it is revealing that the Third Circuit declared the issue presented to be "the propriety of
the arbitrator's determination that CITGO's zero tolerance policy is unreasonable." ' 7 The propriety of the arbitrator's decision on the reasonableness of the
Policy is not a proper consideration on appeal because it is not the place of the
court to consider the merits of the arbitration. 1 8 The CITGO court, by recognizing it was prohibited from reconsidering the merits of the arbitrator's award,' ' 9
and yet doing so in its decision, further obscured the standards enunciated by the
Supreme Court.
The CITGO court cited Third Circuit precedent that apparently recognizes a
"manifest disregard" standard that allows a court to vacate an award if it determines the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the agreement and no support for its
award can be found with principles of contract construction and "law of the
shop."' 20 Further, the Third Circuit confers on itself "province to review an arbi114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 87 (1845) (pointing to Stewart v. Cooley, 23 Minn. 347; S. C., 23
Am. Rep., 690 (1877), as an example of the maxim that a bad case makes bad law because Stewart
represented an exception to the rule).
117. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 816.
118. MISCO, 484 U.S. at 37 (holding that courts have "no business weighing the merits of [a] grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim" (quoting Steelworkers v. Am.
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (emphasis omitted; footnote omitted))).
119. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 815 (stating that the court was "not authorized to reconsider the merits of an
award even thought the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation
of the contract" (citing MISCO, 484 U.S. at 36)).
120. Id. at 816 (citing Exxon, 73 F.3d at 1295).
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trator's interpretation"' 2 ' because the arbitrator only has authority to decide the
issues actually submitted.122 How is it that the Third Circuit does not violate the
Supreme Court's prohibition on reaching the merits of an arbitrator's dispute
when it permits itself to "review an arbitrator's interpretation" and vacate an
award that "manifestly disregards" an agreement by failing to provide adequate
reasoning for its decision linked to the CBA? The answer may be hidden back in
the court's decision in Ludwig Honold
Manufacturing Company v. Fletcher,
23
where the standard was first recognized.
The Ludwig court, in developing this manifest disregard law of the shop stan24
dard, cited a 1968 Supreme Court decision that did not involve labor arbitration.1
This is particularly significant since labor arbitration is considered separate from
mainstream arbitration, especially because it does not fall within the scope of the
FAA. 125 In fact, since the seminal case of Lincoln Mills in 1957, 26 labor arbitration has been governed by federal common law rather than the FAA. 127 Since
Ludwig did not involve labor arbitration, it was improperly relied upon as authority to develop the manifest disregard law of the shop standard relied upon by the
Ludwig court, and subsequently, the CITGO court.
Even if one were to accept the standard of review cited by the CITGO court,
the decision clearly reached the merits of the arbitrator's award in an impermissible way. After scrutinizing some of the stated reasons for the arbitrator's findings,
the CITGO court determined that the arbitrator did not find a "clear abuse of discretion" and that "this record supports none."'128 Here, the court substituted its
own judgment for that of the arbitrator by determining that the arbitrator could not
have found a clear abuse of discretion. It is indeed ironic that the court declares
the arbitrator did not draw his award from the essence of the agreement because
he "simply substituted his judgment
for CITGO's and declared CITGO's zero
' 29
tolerance provision unreasonable."'
While the court succinctly points out that the arbitrator did not use the words
"abuse of discretion" in his written award, this does not lead to a justifiable conclusion that the arbitrator did base his award on such a finding. As the Supreme
Court amply stated in Enterprise Wheel, "[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the
court to give their reasons for an award."'' 30 Furthermore, a "mere ambiguity in the
opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator
may have
exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the
13 1
award."

121. Id. (citing Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113).
122. Id. (citing Matteson,99 F.3d at 112).
123. 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding that "only where there is a manifest disregard of the
agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of the shop, may a
reviewing court disturb the award"). The authority cited by the Ludwig court for this determination
was Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 (1968), a non-labor
case falling under the purview of the FAA.
124. Ludwig, 405 F.2d at 1128.
125. WARE, supra note 37, at 105.
126. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
127. WARE, supra note 37, at 106.
128. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 817 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598.
131. Id.
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Not only did the CITGO court find that an abuse of discretion standard was
not satisfied by the arbitrator, it also contended that the record did not support his
award with a mere reasonableness standard either.' 32 In sypport of its contention,
the court posited that the arbitrator based his award on only two facts; first, that
two other companies with inferior safety records do not have zero tolerance policies, and second, that provisions of the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing
Act of 1991,133 and the DOT regulations under it, 134 allow employees a second
chance for rehabilitation.' 35 There can be no doubt that the court reached the merits here when it determined that it would be unreasonable to conclude, based on
these facts, that the company was acting unreasonable in implementing its no
tolerance policy.
The Supreme Court in MISCO held that courts have "no business weighing
the merits of [a] grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular
claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim."' 36 Here, the CITGO court appears to hold
that absent "particular language in the written instrument to support the claim,"
the arbitrator's award fails to draw its essence from the CBA. In so doing, the
Third Circuit has refused the clear mandates of the Supreme Court and further
undermines the effectiveness of labor organization's agreement to arbitrate.
Since the quintessential element of arbitration is the removal of the judiciary
from the decision making process, each time a court reaches the merits of a dispute and vacates an award more liberally than what the Supreme Court has proscribed, it undermines the purpose for which arbitration was developed. By implicitly refusing to apply Supreme Court precedent, not only did the CITGO court
undermine the party's agreement to arbitrate, it further contributed to the confuby circuit courts that must interpret their
sion and misapplication of precedent
1 37
permissible role of arbitral review.
While the Supreme Court has never sustained vacatur of a labor arbitration
award because it failed to draw its essence from the governing CBA, it has reversed circuit courts on many occasions for misapplying this standard, most recently resorting to a per curium opinion to do so.' 18 Despite strong language and
consistent rhetoric from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts, like the Third Circuit in the instant case, have essentially ignored precedent and consistently refused
to let arbitrators have the final say in resolving disputes. If the Supreme Court
hopes to silence this dissent, it will need to increase its willingness to grant certiorari and summarily reverse courts that misapply the "drawn from the essence"
standard. Just as the Ninth Circuit seems to have gotten the message only after the
reversal of lower courts in Garvey, so too may other circuits, including the Third

132. CITGO, 385 F.3d at 818.
133. Id. at 819 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31306 etseq. 2005).
134. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 382.101 et seq. 2005).
135. Id.
136. MISCO, 484 U.S. at 37 (quoting Steelworkers v. Am.Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960)
(emphasis omitted; footnote omitted)). Furthermore, the MISCO court held that "a court should not
reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract." Id. at 38.
137. Jamie Byrnes and Allison Prout, Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey: Revisiting the StandardforArbitral Review, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.389, 402 (2002).
138. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
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Circuit, need to be individually reversed before they properly apply the Court's
precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CITGO court helps illustrate just how far the circuit courts have strayed
from Supreme Court precedent as it relates to labor arbitration. Although these
courts routinely give lip service to decisions such as MISCO and Enterprise
Wheel, they often, as here, fail to take the Court's precedent seriously. Lower
courts are often asked to enforce awards made by arbitrators who may not even be
legal professionals, and whose decisions could not be supported had they been
rendered by a court and subject to de novo review.' 39 Rather than exercise judicial
restraint by simply affirming the bargain (and risk associated with it) to which the
parties to a CBA agreed, courts often fail to restrain themselves in reaching the
merits and vacating the award, and in the process create new tests that water down
the Supreme Court's essence test.
While the Third Circuit in CITGO obviously disagreed with the standard and
reasoning used by the arbitrator in rendering his award, the Supreme Court is clear
in holding that this is not a ground for vacatur. Part of the Third Circuit's misapplication may stem from earlier decisions confusing standards applicable to nonlabor arbitration, which falls under the FAA, and labor arbitration, which is subject to federal common law developed around the LMRA. Although the Supreme
Court has reversed several courts of appeals for their willingness to reach the merits of a labor arbitration dispute, the Court now needs to increase its willingness to
grant certiorari to reverse circuit decisions that misapply the standard. If the Court
fails to maintain a strict standard of review, it may sound the death knell for labor
arbitration by removing its quintessential element-the
finality that is meant to
4
exist far removed from the judicial process.1 0
JONATHAN R. WALDRON

139. Byrnes & Prout, supra note 137, at 402.
140. Id.
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